The Original Position
Ronald Dworkint
I
I trust that it is not necessary to describe John Rawls's famous idea
of the original position in any great detail. It imagines a group of men
and women who come together to form a social contract. Thus far it
resembles the imaginary congresses of the classical social contract theories. The original position differs, however, from these theories in its
description of the parties. They are men and women with ordinary
tastes, talents, ambitions, and convictions, but each is temporarily ignorant of these features of his own personality, and must agree upon
a contract before his self-awareness returns.
Rawls tries to show that if these men and women are rational, and
act only in their own self-interest, they will choose his two principles
of justice. These provide, roughly, that every person must have the
largest political liberty compatible with a like liberty for all, and that
inequalities in power, wealth, income, and other resources must not
exist except in so far as they work to the absolute benefit of the worstoff members of society. Many of Rawls's critics disagree that men and
women in the original position would inevitably choose these two
principles. The principles are conservative, and the critics believe they
would be chosen only by men who were conservative by temperament,
and not by men who were natural gamblers. I do not think this criticism is well-taken, but in this essay, at least, I mean to ignore the point.
I am interested in a different issue.
Suppose that the critics are wrong, and that men and women in the
original position would in fact choose Rawls's two principles as being
in their own best interest. Rawls seems to think that that fact would
provide an argument in favor of these two principles as a standard
of justice against which to test actual political institutions. But it is not
immediately plain why this should be so.
If a group contracted in advance that disputes amongst them would
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be settled in a particular way, the fact of that contract would be a
powerful argument that such disputes should be settled in that way
when they do arise. The contract would be an argument in itself, independent of the force of the reasons that might have led different people
to enter the contract. Ordinarily, for example, each of the parties supposes that a contract he signs is in his own interest; but if someone has
made a mistake in calculating his self-interest, the fact that he did contract is a strong reason for the fairness of holding him nevertheless
to the bargain.
Rawls does not suppose that any group ever entered into a social
contract of the sort he describes. He argues only that if a group of
rational men did find themselves in the predicament of the original
position, they would contract for the two principles. His contract is
hypothetical, and hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent
argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract
at all.
If, for example, I am playing a game, it may be that I would have
agreed to any number of ground rules if I had been asked in advance
of play. It does not follow that these rules may be enforced against me
if I have not, in fact, agreed to them. There must be reasons, of course,
why I would have agreed if asked in advance, and these may also be
reasons why it is fair to enforce these rules against me even if I have
not agreed. But my hypothetical agreement does not count as a reason,
independent of these other reasons, for enforcing the rules against me,
as my actual agreement would have.
Suppose that you and I are playing poker and we find, in the middle
of a hand, that the deck is one card short. You suggest that we throw
the hand in, but I refuse because I know I am going to win and I want
the money in the pot. You might say that I would certainly have agreed
to that procedure had the possibility of the deck being short been
raised in advance. But your point is not that I am somehow committed
to throwing the hand in by an agreement I never made. Rather you
use the device of a hypothetical agreement to make a point that might
have been made without that device, which is that the solution recommended is so obviously fair and sensible that only someone with an
immediate contrary interest could disagree. Your main argument is
that your solution is fair and sensible, and the fact that I would have
chosen it myself adds nothing of substance to that argument. If I am
able to meet the main argument nothing remains, rising out of your
claim that I would have agreed, to be answered or excused.
In some circumstances, moreover, the fact that I would have agreed
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does not even suggest an independent argument of this character.
Everything depends on your reasons for supposing that I would have
agreed. Suppose you say that I would have agreed, if you had brought
up the point and insisted on your solution, because I very much wanted
to play and would have given in rather than miss my chance. I might
concede that I would have agreed for that reason, and then add that
I am lucky that you did not raise the point. The fact that I would have
agreed if you had insisted neither adds nor suggests any argument why
I should agree now. The point is not that it would have been unfair of
you to insist on your proposal as a condition of playing; indeed, it
would not have been. If you had held out for you proposal, and I had
agreed, I could not say that my agreement was in any way nullified or
called into question because of duress. But if I had not in fact agreed,
the fact that I would have in itself mean nothing.
I do not mean that it is never relevant, in deciding whether an act
affecting someone is fair, that he would have consented if asked. If a
doctor finds a man unconscious and bleeding, for example, it might be
important for him to ask whether the man would consent to a transfusion if he were conscious. If there is every reason to think that he
would, that fact is important in justifying the transfusion if the patient
later, perhaps because he has undergone a religious conversion, condemns the doctor for having proceeded. But this sort of case is beside
the present point, because the patient's hypothetical agreement shows
that his will was inclined towards the decision at the time and in the
circumstances that the decision was taken. He has lost nothing by not
being consulted at the appropriate time, because he would have consented if he had been. The original position argument is very different.
If we take it to argue for the fairness of applying the two principles
we must take it to argue that because a man would have consented to
certain principles if asked in advance, it is fair to apply those principles
to him later, under different circumstances, when he does not consent.
But that is a bad argument. Suppose I did not know the value of my
painting on Monday; if you had offered me $100 for it then I would
have accepted. On Tuesday I discovered it was valuable. You cannot
argue that it would be fair for the courts to make me sell it to you for
$100 on Wednesday. It may be my good fortune that you did not ask
me on Monday, but that does not justify coercion against me later.
We must therefore treat the argument from the original position as
we treat your argument in the poker game; it must be a device for
calling attention to some independent argument for the fairness of the
two principles-an argument that does not rest on the false premise
that a hypothetical contract has some pale binding force. What other
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argument is available? One might say that the original position shows
that the two principles are in the best interests of every member of
any political community, and that it is fair to govern in accordance
with them for that reason. It is true that if the two principles could be
shown to be in everyone's interest, that would be a sound argument for
their fairness, but it is hard to see how the original position can be used
to show that they are.
We must be careful to distinguish two senses in which something
might be said to be in my interest. It is in my antecedent interest to
make a bet on a horse that, all things considered, offers the best odds,
even if, in the event, the horse loses. It is in my actual interest to bet
on the horse that wins, even if the bet was, at the time I made it, a silly
one. If the original position furnishes an argument that it is in everyone's interest to accept the two principles over other possible bases for
a constitution, it must be an argument that uses the idea of antecedent
and not actual interest. It is not in the actual best interest of everyone
to choose the two principles, because when the veil of ignorance is
lifted some will discover that they would have been better off if some
other principle, like the principle of average utility, had been chosen.
A judgment of antecedent interest depends upon the circumstances
under which the judgment is made, and, in particular, upon the knowledge available to the man making the judgment. It might be in my
antecedent interest to bet on a certain horse at given odds before the
starting gun, but not, at least at the same odds, after he has stumbled
on the first turn. The fact, therefore, that a particular choice is in my
interest at a particular time, under conditions of great uncertainty, is
not a good argument for the fairness of enforcing that choice against
me later under conditions of much greater knowledge. But that is what,
on this interpretation, the original position argument suggests, because
it seeks to justify the contemporary use of the two principles on the
supposition that, under conditions very different from present conditions, it would be in the antecedent interest of everyone to agree to
them. If I have bought a ticket on a longshot it might be in my antecedent interest, before the race, to sell the ticket to you for twice what
I paid; it does not follow that it is fair for you to take it from me for
that sum when the longshot is about to win.
Someone might now say that I have misunderstood the point of the
special conditions of uncertainty in the original position. The parties
are made ignorant of their special resources and talents to prevent
them from bargaining for principles that are inherently unfair because
they favor some collection of resources and talents over others. If the
man in the original position does not know his special interests, he
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cannot negotiate to favor them. In that case, it might be said, the uncertainty of the original position does not vitiate the argument from
antecedent interest as I have suggested, but only limits the range within
which self-interest might operate. The argument shows that the two
principles are in everyone's interest once obviously unfair principles
are removed from consideration by the device of uncertainty. Since the
only additional knowledge contemporary men and women have over
men and women in the original position is knowledge that they ought
not to rely upon in choosing principles of justice, their antecedent interest is, so far as it is relevant, the same, and if that is so the original
position argument does offer a good argument for applying the two
principles to contemporary politics.
But surely this confuses the argument that Rawls makes with a different argument that he might have made. Suppose his men and
women had full knowledge of their own talents and tastes, but had to
reach agreement under conditions that ruled out, simply by stipulation,
obviously unfair principles like those providing special advantage for
named individuals. If Rawls could show that, once such obviously unfair principles had been set aside, it would be in the interest of everyone to settle for his two principles, that would indeed count as an
argument for the two principles. My point-that the antecedent selfinterest of men in the original position is different from that of contemporary men-would no longer hold because both groups of men
would then have the same knowledge about themselves, and be subject
to the same moral restrictions against choosing obviously unfair principles.
Rawls's actual argument is quite different, however. The ignorance
in which his men must choose affects their calculations of self-interest,
and cannot be described merely as setting boundaries within which
these calculations must be applied. Rawls supposes, for example, that
his men would inevitably choose conservative principles because this
would be the only rational choice, in their ignorance, for self-interested
men to make. But some actual men, aware of their own talents, might
well prefer less conservative principles that would allow them to take
advantage of the resources they know they have. Someone who considers the original position an argument for the conservative principles,
therefore, is faced with this choice. If less conservative principles, like
principles that favor named individuals, are to be ruled out as obviously unfair, then the argument for the conservative principles is
complete at the outset, on grounds of obvious fairness alone. In that
case neither the original position nor any considerations of self-interest
it is meant to demonstrate play any role in the argument. But if less
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conservative principles cannot be ruled out in advance as obviously
unfair, then imposing ignorance on Rawls's men, so that they prefer
the more conservative principles, cannot be explained simply as ruling
out obviously unfair choices. And since this affects the antecedent selfinterest of these men, the argument that the original position demonstrates the antecedent self-interest of actual men must therefore fail.
This same dilemma can, of course, be constructed for each feature of
the two principles.
I recognize that the argument thus far seems to ignore a distinctive
feature of Rawls's methodology, which he describes as the technique
of seeking a "reflective equilibrium" between our ordinary, unreflective moral beliefs and some theoretical structure that might unify and
justify these ordinary beliefs.1 It might now be said that the idea of an
original position plays a part in this reflective equilibrium, which we
will miss if we insist, as I have, on trying to find a more direct, one-way
argument from the original position to the two principles of justice.
The technique of equilibrium does play an important role in Rawls's
argument, and it is worth describing that technique briefly here. The
technique assumes that Rawls's readers have a sense, which we draw
upon in our daily life, that certain particular political arrangements or
decisions like conventional trials, are just and others, like slavery, are
unjust. It assumes, moreover, that we are each able to arrange these
immediate intuitions or convictions in an order that designates some
of them as more certain than others. Most people, for example, think
that it is more plainly unjust for the state to execute innocent citizens
of its own than to kill innocent foreign civilians in war. They might be
prepared to abandon their position on foreign civilians in war, on the
basis of some argument, but would be much more reluctant to abandon
their view on executing innocent countrymen.
It is the task of moral philosophy, according to the technique of
equilibrium, to provide a structure of principles that supports these
immediate convictions about which we are more or less secure, with
two goals in mind. First, this structure of principles must explain the
convictions by showing the underlying assumptions they reflect; second, it must provide guidance in those cases about which we have
either no convictions or weak or contradictory convictions. If we are
unsure, for example, whether economic institutions that allow great
disparity of wealth are unjust, we may turn to the principles that explain our confident convictions, and then apply these principles to that
difficult issue.
I Pp. 48

ff.
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But the process is not simply one of finding principles that accommodate our more-or-less settled judgments. These principles must support, and not merely account for, our judgments, and this means that
the principles must have independent appeal to our moral sense. It
might be, for example, that a cluster of familiar moral convictions
could be shown to serve an undeserving policy-perhaps, that the standard judgments we make without reflection serve the purpose of maintaining one particular class in political power. But this discovery would
not vouch for the principle of class egoism; on the contrary, it would
discredit our ordinary judgments, unless some other principle of a
more respectable sort could be found that also fits our intuitions, in
which case it would be this principle and not the class-intent principle
that our intuitions would recommend.
It might be that no coherent set of principles could be found that
has independent appeal and that supports the full set of our immediate
convictions; indeed it would be surprising if this were not often the
case. If that does happen, we must compromise, giving way on both
sides. We might relax, though we could not abandon, our initial sense
of what might be an acceptable principle. We might come to accept,
for example, after further reflection, some principle that seemed to us
initially unattractive, perhaps the principle that men should sometimes
be made to be free. We might accept this principle if we were satisfied
that no less harsh principle could support the set of political convictions we were especially reluctant to abandon. On the other hand, we
must also be ready to modify or adjust, or even to give up entirely,
immediate convictions that cannot be accommodated by any principle
that meets our relaxed standards; in adjusting these immediate convictions we will use our initial sense of which seem to us more and
which less certain, though in principle no immediate conviction can be
taken as immune from reinspection or abandonment if that should prove
necessary. We can expect to proceed back and forth between our immediate judgments and the structure of explanatory principles in this
way, tinkering first with one side and then the other, until we arrive
at what Rawls calls the state of reflective equilibrium in which we are
satisfied, or as much satisfied as we can reasonably expect.
It may well be that, at least for most of us, our ordinary political
judgments stand in this relation of reflective equilibrium with Rawls's
two principles of justice, or, at least, that they could be made to do so
through the process of adjustment just described. It is nevertheless unclear how the idea of the original position fits into this structure or,
indeed, why it has any role to play at all. The original position is not
among the ordinary political convictions that we find we have, and
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that we turn to reflective equilibrium to justify. If it has any role, it
must be in the process of justification, because it takes its place in the
body of theory we construct to bring our convictions into balance. But
if the two principles of justice are themselves in reflective equilibrium
with our convictions, it is unclear why we need the original position
to supplement the two principles on the theoretical side of the balance.
What can the idea contribute to a harmony already established?
We should consider the following answer. It is one of the conditions
we impose on a theoretical principle, before we allow it to figure as a
justification of our convictions, that the people the principle would
govern would have accepted that principle, at least under certain conditions, if they had been asked, or at least that the principle can be
shown to be in the antecedent interest of every such person. If this is so,
then the original position plays an essential part in the process of justification through equilibrium. It is used to show that the two principles conform to this established standard of acceptability for political
principles. At the same time, the fact that the two principles, which
do conform to that standard, justify our ordinary convictions in reflective equilibrium reinforces our faith in the standard and encourages
us to apply it to other issues of political or moral philosophy.
This answer does not advance the case that the original position
furnishes an argument for the two principles, however; it merely restates the ideas we have already considered and rejected. It is certainly
not part of our established political traditions or ordinary moral understanding that principles are acceptable only if they would be chosen
by men in the particular predicament of the original position. It is, of
course, part of these traditions that principles are fair if they have in
fact been chosen by those whom they govern, or if they can at least be
shown to be in their antecedent common interest. But we have already
seen that the original position device cannot be used to support either
of these arguments in favor of applying the two principles to contemporary politics. If the original position is to play any role in a structure
of principles and convictions in reflective equilibrium, it must be by
virtue of assumptions we have not yet identified.
It is time to reconsider an earlier assumption. So far I have been
treating the original position construction as if it were either the foundation of Rawls's argument or an ingredient in a reflective equilibrium
established between our political intuitions and his two principles of
justice. But, in fact, Rawls does not treat the original position that
way. He describes the construction in these words:
I have emphasized that this original position is purely hypothet-
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ical. It is natural to ask why, if this agreement is never actually
entered into, we should take any interest in these principles, moral
or otherwise. The answer is that the conditions embodied in the
description of the original position are ones that we do in fact
accept. Or if we do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do
so by philosophical reflection. Each aspect of the contractual situation can be given supporting grounds.. . . On the other hand,
this conception is also an intuitive notion that suggests its own
elaboration, so that led on by it we are drawn to define more
clearly the standpoint from which we can best interpret moral
relationships. We need a conception that enables us to envision
our objective from afar: the intuitive notion of the original position is to do this for us. 2
This description is taken from Rawls's first statement of the original
position. It is recalled and repeated in the very last paragraph of the
book.3 It is plainly of capital importance, and it suggests that the original position, far from being the foundation of his argument, or an
expository device for the technique of equilibrium, is one of the major
substantive products of the theory as a whole. Its importance is reflected in another crucial passage. Rawls describes his moral theory as
a type of psychology. He wants to characterize the structure of our (or,
at least, one person's) capacity to make moral judgments of a certain
sort, that is, judgments about justice. He thinks that the conditions
embodied in the original position are the fundamental "principles governing our moral powers, or, more specifically, our sense of justice."4
The original position is therefore a schematic representation of a particular mental process of at least some, and perhaps most, human
beings, just as depth grammar, he suggests, is a schematic presentation
of a different mental capacity.
All this suggests that the original position is an intermediate conclusion, a halfway point in a deeper theory that provides philosophical
arguments for its conditions. In the next part of this essay I shall try
to describe at least the main outlines of this deeper theory. I shall distinguish three features of the surface argument of the book-the technique of equilibrium, the social contract, and the original position
itself-and try to discern which of various familiar philosophical principles or positions these represent.
First, however, I must say a further word about Rawls's exciting, if
imprecise, idea that the principles of this deeper theory are constitutive
2 Pp. 21-22.
8 P. 587.
4 P. 51.

1973]

The Original Position

of our moral capacity. That idea can be understood on different levels
of profundity. It may mean, at its least profound, that the principles
that support the original position as a device for reasoning about justice are so widely shared and so little questioned within a particular
community, for whom the book is meant, that the community could
not abandon these principles without fundamentally changing its patterns of reasoning and arguing about political morality. It may mean,
at its most profound, that these principles are innate categories of morality common to all men, imprinted in their neural structure, so that
man could not deny these principles short of abandoning the power
to reason about morality at all.
I shall be guided, in what follows, by the less profound interpretation, though what I shall say, I think, is consistent with the more profound. I shall assume, then, that there is a group of men and women
who find, on reading Rawls, that the original position does strike them
as a proper "intuitive notion" from which to think about problems of
justice, and who would find it persuasive, if it could be demonstrated
that the parties to the original position would in fact contract for the
two principles he describes. I suppose, on the basis of experience and
the literature, that this group contains a very large number of those
who think about justice at all, and I find that I am a member myself.
I want to discover the hidden assumptions that bend the inclinations
of this group that way, and I shall do so by repeating the question with
which I began. Why does Rawls's argument support his claim that his
two principles are principles of justice? My answer is complex and it
will take us, at times, far from his text, but not, I think, from its spirit.
II
Equilibrium
I shall start by considering the philosophical basis of the technique
of equilibrium I just described. I must spend several pages in this way,
but it is important to understand what substantive features of Rawls's
deep theory are required by his method. This technique presupposes,
as I said, a familiar fact about our moral lives. We all entertain beliefs
about justice that we hold because they seem right, not because we
have deduced or inferred them from other beliefs. We may believe
in this way, for example, that slavery is unjust, and that the standard
sort of trial is fair.
These different sorts of beliefs are, according to some philosophers,
direct perceptions of some independent and objective moral facts. In
the view of other philosophers they are simply subjective preferences,
not unlike ordinary tastes, but dressed up in the language of justice
A.
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to indicate how important they seem to us. In any event, when we argue
with ourselves or each other about justice we use these accustomed
beliefs-which we call "intuitions" or "convictions"-in roughly the
way Rawls's equilibrium technique suggests. We test general theories
about justice against our own intuitions, and we try to confound those
who disagree with us by showing how their own intuitions embarrass
their own theories.
Suppose we try to justify this process by setting out a philosophical
position about the connection between moral theory and moral intuition. The technique of equilibrium supposes what might be called a
"coherence" theory of morality. 5 But we have a choice between two
general models that define coherence and explain why it is required,
and the choice between these is significant and consequential for our
moral philosophy. I shall describe these two models, and then argue
that the equilibrium technique makes sense on one but not the other.
I call the first a "natural" model. It presupposes a philosophical position that can be summarized in this way. Theories of justice, like
Rawls's two principles, describe an objective moral reality; they are
not, that is, created by men or societies but are rather discovered by
them, as they discover laws of physics. The main instrument of this
discovery is a moral faculty possessed by at least some men, which produces concrete intuitions of political morality in particular situations,
like the intuition that slavery is wrong. These intuitions are clues to
the nature and existence of more abstract and fundamental moral
principles, as physical observations are clues to the existence and nature of fundamental physical laws. Moral reasoning or philosophy is a
process of reconstructing the fundamental principles by assembling
concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural historian reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones
that he has found.
The second model is quite different. It treats intuitions of justice
not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but rather as
stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if a sculptor
set himself to carve the animal that best fit a pile of bones he happened
to find together. This "constructive" model does not assume, as the
natural model does, that principles of justice have some fixed, objective
existence, so that descriptions of these principles must be true or false
in some standard way. It does not assume that the animal it matches to
the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and in some ways more
complex, assumption that men and women have a responsibility to fit
5 See Feinberg, Justice, Fairnessand Rationality, 81
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the particular judgments on which they act into a coherent program
of action, or, at least, that officials who exercise power over other men
have that sort of responsibility.
This second, constructive, model is not unfamiliar to lawyers. It is
analogous to one model of common law adjudication. Suppose a judge
is faced with a novel claim-for example, a claim for damages based on
a legal right to privacy that courts have not heretofore recognized. 6 He
must examine such precedents as seem in any way relevant to see
whether any principles that are, as we might say, "instinct" in these
precedents bear upon the claimed right to privacy. We might treat
this judge as being in the position of a man arguing from moral intuitions to a general moral theory. The particular precedents are analogous to intuitions; the judge tries to reach an accommodation between
these precedents and a set of principles that might justify them and
also justify further decisions that go beyond them. He does not suppose, however, that the precedents are glimpses into a moral reality,
and therefore clues to objective principles he ends by declaring. He
does not believe that the principles are "instinct" in the precedents in
that sense. Instead, in the spirit of the constructive model, he accepts
these precedents as specifications for a principle that he must construct,
out of a sense of responsibility for consistency with what has gone before.
I want to underline the important difference between the two models. Suppose that an official holds, with reasonable conviction, some
intuition that cannot be reconciled with his other intuitions by any
set of principles he can now fashion. He may think, for example, that
it is unjust to punish an attempted murder as severely as a successful
one, and yet be unable to reconcile that position with his sense that a
man's guilt is properly assessed by considering only what he intended,
and not what actually happened. Or he may think that a particular
minority race, as such, is entitled to special protection, and be unable
to reconcile that view with his view that distinctions based on race are
inherently unfair to individuals. When an official is in this position
the two models give him different advice.
The natural model supports a policy of following the troublesome
intuition, and submerging the apparent contradiction, in the faith that
a more sophisticated set of principles, which reconciles that intuition,
does in fact exist though it has not yet been discovered. The official,
6 I have here in mind the fairness argument of Brandeis and Warren. See Brandeis &
Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890), which is a paradigm of argupient in the constructive model,
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according to this model, is in the position of the astronomer who has
clear observational data that he is as yet unable to reconcile in any
coherent account, for example, of the origin of the solar system. He
continues to accept and employ his observational data, placing his faith
in the idea that some reconciling explanation does exist though it has
not been, and for all he knows may never be, discovered by men.
The natural model supports this policy because it is based on a
philosophical position that encourages the analogy between moral intuitions and observational data. It makes perfect sense, on that assumption, to suppose that direct observations, made through a moral faculty,
have outstripped the explanatory powers of those who observe. It also
makes sense to suppose that some correct explanation, in the shape of
-principles of morality, does in fact exist in spite of this failure; if the
direct observations are sound, some explanation must exist for why
matters are as they have been observed to be in the moral universe,
just as some explanation must exist for why matters are as they have
been observed to be in the physical universe.
The constructive model, however, does not support the policy of
submerging apparent inconsistency in the faith that reconciling principles must exist. On the contrary, it demands that decisions taken in
the name of justice must never outstrip an official's ability to account
for these decisions in a theory of justice, even when such a theory must
compromise some of his intuitions. It demands that we act on principle rather than on faith. Its engine is a doctrine of responsibility that
requires men to integrate their intuitions and subordinate some of
these, when necessary, to that responsibility. It presupposes that articulated consistency, decisions in accordance with a program that can be
made public and followed until changed, is essential to any conception
of justice. An official in the position I describe, guided by this model,
must give up his apparently inconsistent position; he must do so even
if he hopes one day, by further reflection, to devise better principles
7
that will allow all his initial convictions to stand as principles.
The constructive model does not presuppose scepticism or relativism. On the contrary, it assumes that the men and women who reason
within the model will each hold sincerely the convictions they bring
to it, and that this sincerity will extend to criticizing as unjust political
acts or systems that offend the most profound of these. The model does
7 The fairness debate between Professor Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1959), and his critics may be illuminated by this distinction. Wechsler proposes a constructive model for constitutional adjudication, while
those who favor a more tentative or intuitive approach to constitutional law are following
the material model.
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not deny, any more than it affirms, the objective standing of any of
these convictions; it is therefore consistent with, though as a model of
reasoning it does not require, the moral ontology that the natural
model presupposes.
It does not require that ontology because its requirements are independent of it. The natural model insists on consistency with conviction,
on the assumption that moral intuitions are accurate observations; the
requirement of consistency follows from that assumption. The constructive model insists on consistency with conviction as an independent
requirement, flowing not from the assumption that these convictions
are accurate reports, but from the different assumption that it is unfair
for officials to act except on the basis of a general public theory that
will constrain them to consistency, provide a public standard for testing or debating or predicting what they do, and not allow appeals to
unique intuitions that might mask prejudice or self-interest in particular cases. The constructive model requires coherence, then, for
independent reasons of political morality; it takes convictions held
with the requisite sincerity as given, and seeks to impose conditions on
the acts that these intuitions might be said to warrant. If the constructive model is to constitute morality, in either of the senses I have distinguished, these independent reasons of political morality are at the
heart of our political theories.
The two models, therefore, represent different standpoints from
which theories of justice might be developed. The natural model, we
might say, looks at intuitions from the personal standpoint of the individual who holds them, and who takes them to be discrete observations
of moral reality. The constructive model looks at these intuitions from
a more public standpoint; it is a model that someone might propose
for the governance of a community each of whose members has strong
convictions that differ, though not too greatly, from the convictions
of others.
The constructive model is appealing, from this public standpoint,
for an additional reason. It is well suited to group consideration of
problems of justice, that is, to developing a theory that can be said to
be the theory of a community rather than of particular individuals,
and this is an enterprise that is important, for example, in adjudication. The range of initial convictions to be assessed can be expanded
or contracted to accommodate the intuitions of a larger or smaller
group, either by including all convictions held by any members, or by
excluding those not held by all, as the particular calculation might
warrant. This process would be self-destructive on the natural model,
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because every individual would believe that either false observations
were being taken into account or accurate observations disregarded,
and hence that the inference to objective morality was invalid. But
on the constructive model that objection would be unavailable; the
model, so applied, would be appropriate to identify the program of
justice that best accommodates the community's common convictions,
for example, with no claim to a description of an objective moral universe.
Which of these two models, then, better supports the technique of
equilibrium? Some commentators seem to have assumed that the technique commits Rawls to the natural model.8 But the alliance between
that model and the equilibrium technique turns out to be only superficial; when we probe deeper we find that they are incompatible. In
the first place, the natural model cannot explain one distinctive feature
of the technique. It explains why our theory of justice must fit our
intuitions about justice, but it does not explain why we are justified
in amending these intuitions to make the fit more secure.
Rawls's notion of equilibrium, as I said earlier, is a two-way process;
we move back and forth between adjustments to theory and adjustments to conviction until the best fit possible is achieved. If my settled
convictions can otherwise be captured by, for example, a straightforward utilitarian theory of justice, that may be a reason, within the
technique, for discarding my intuition that slavery would be wrong
even if it advanced utility. But on the natural model this would be
nothing short of cooking the evidence, as if a naturalist rubbed out the
footprints that embarrassed his efforts to describe the animal that left
them, or the astronomer just set aside the observations that his theory
could not accommodate.
We must be careful not to lose this point in false sophistication about
science. It is common to say-Rawls himself draws the comparisonothat scientists also adjust their evidence to achieve a smooth set of
explanatory principles. But if this is true at all, their procedures are
very different from those recommended by the technique of equilibrium. Consider, to take a familiar example, optical illusions or hallucinations. It is perfectly true that the scientist who sees water in the
sand does not say that the pond was really there until he arrived at it,
so that physics must be revised to provide for disappearing water; on
the contrary, he uses the apparent disappearing as evidence of an illu8 See e.g., Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice-I, 28 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 144 (1973).
9 Rawls draws attention to the distinction. P. 49.
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sion, that is, as evidence that, contrary to his observation, there was
never any water there at all.
The scientists, of course, cannot leave the matter at that. He cannot
dismiss mirages unless he supplements the laws of physics with laws of
optics that explain them. It may be that he has, in some sense, a choice
amongst competing sets of explanations of all his observations taken
together. He may have a choice, for example, between either treating
mirages as physical objects of a special sort and then amending the laws
of physics to allow for disappearing objects of this sort, or treating
mirages as optical illusions and then developing laws of optics to explain
such illusions. He has a choice in the sense that his experience does not
absolutely force either of these explanations upon him; the former is a
possible choice, though it would require wholesale revision of both
physics and common sense to carry it off.
This is, I take it, what is meant by philosophers like Quine who suppose that our concepts and our theories face our experience as a whole,
so that we might react to recalcitrant or surprising experience by
making different revisions at different places in our theoretical structures if we wish.' 0 Regardless of whether this is an accurate picture of
scientific reasoning, it is not a picture of the procedure of equilibrium,
because this procedure argues not simply that alternative structures of
principle are available to explain the same phenomena, but that some
of the phenomena, in the form of moral convictions, may simply be
ignored the better to serve some particular theory.
It is true that Rawls sometimes describes the procedure in a more
innocent way. He suggests that if our tentative theories of justice do not
fit some particular intuition, this should act as a warning light requiring
us to reflect on whether the conviction is really one we hold."' If my
convictions otherwise support a principle of utility, but I feel that
slavery would be unjust even if utility were improved, I might think
about slavery again, in a calmer way, and this time my intuitions might
be different and consistent with that principle. In this case, the initial
inconsistency is used as an occasion for reconsidering the intuition, but
not as a reason for abandoning it.
Still, this need not happen. I might continue to receive the former
intuition, no matter how firmly I steeled myself against it. In that case
the procedure nevertheless authorizes me to set it aside if that is required to achieve the harmony of equilibrium. But if I do, I am not
offering an alternative account of the evidence, but simply disregarding
10 W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FRoM A LOGICAL PoINT OF VIEW 20 (2d

ed. rev. 1964).
11 P. 48.
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it. Someone else, whose intuitions are different, may say that mine are
distorted, perhaps because of some childhood experience, or because
I am insufficiently imaginative to think of hypothetical cases in which
slavery might actually improve utility. He may say, that is, that my
sensibilities are defective here, so that my intuitions are not genuine
perceptions of moral reality, and may be set aside like the flawed reports
of a color-blind man.
But I cannot accept that about myself, as an explanation for my own
troublesome convictions, so long as I hold these convictions and they
seem to me sound, indistinguishable in their moral quality from my
other convictions. I am in a different position from the color-blind man
who need only come to understand that others' perceptions differ from
his. If I believe that my intuitions are a direct report from some moral
reality, I cannot accept that one particular intuition is false until I come
to feel or sense that it is false. The bare fact that others disagree, if they
do, may be an occasion for consulting my intuitions again, but if my
convictions remain the same, the fact that others may explain them in
a different way cannot be a reason for my abandoning them, instead of
retaining them in the faith that a reconciliation of these with my other
convictions does in fact exist.
Thus, the natural model does not offer a satisfactory explanation of
the two-way feature of equilibrium. Even if it did, however, it would
leave other features of that technique unexplained; it would leave unexplained, for example, the fact that the results of the technique, at
least in Rawls's hands, are necessarily and profoundly practical. Rawlsian men and women in the original position seek to find principles that
they and their successors will find it easy to understand and publicize
and observe; principles otherwise appealing are to be rejected or adjusted because they are too complex or are otherwise impractical in this
sense. But principles of justice selected in this spirit are compromises
with infirmity, and are contingent in the sense that they will change
as the general condition and education of people change. This seems
inconsistent with the spirit, at least, of the natural model, according to
which principles of justice are timeless features of some independent
moral reality, to which imperfect men and women must attempt to conform at best they can.
The equilibrium technique, moreover, is designed to produce principles that are relative in at least two ways. First, it is designed to select
the best theory of justice from a list of alternative theories that must not
only be finite, but short enough to make comparisons among them
feasible. This limitation is an important one; it leads Rawls himself to
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say that he has no doubt that an initial list of possible theories expanded
well beyond the list he considers would contain a better theory of
justice than his own two principles. 12 Second, it yields results that are
relative to the area of initial agreement among those who jointly conduct the speculative experiments it recommends. It is designed, as Rawls
says, to reconcile men who disagree by fixing on what is common ground
among them.' 3 The test concededly will yield different results for different groups, and for the same group at different times, as the common ground of confident intuition shifts.
If the equilibrium technique were used within the natural model,
the authority of its conclusions would be seriously compromised by both
forms of relativism. If the equilibrium argument for Rawls's two principles, for example, shows only that a better case can be made for them
than for any other principles on a restricted short list, and if Rawls
himself is confident that further study would produce a better theory,
then we have very little reason to suppose that these two principles are
an accurate description of moral reality. It is hard to see, on the natural
model, why they then should have any authority at all.
Indeed, the argument provides no very good ground for supposing
even that the two principles are a better description of moral reality
than other theories on the short list. Suppose we are asked to choose,
among five theories of justice, the theory that best unites our convictions in reflective equilibrium, and we pick, from among these, the fifth.
Let us assume that there is some sixth theory that we would have chosen
had it appeared on the list. This sixth theory might be closer to, for
example, the first on our original list than to the fifth, at least in the
following sense: over a long term, a society following the first might
reach more of the decisions that a society following the sixth would
reach than would a society following the fifth.
Suppose, for example, that our original list included, as available
theories of justice, classical utilitarianism and Rawls's two principles,
but did not include average utilitarianism. We might have rejected
classical utilitarianism on the ground that the production of pleasure
for its own sake, unrelated to any increase in the welfare of particular
human beings or other animals, makes little sense, and then chosen
Rawls's two principles as the best of the theories left. We might nevertheless have chosen average utilitarianism as superior to the two principles, if it had been on the list, because average utilitarianism does not
suppose that just any increase in the total quantity of pleasure is good.
12 P.581.
13 Pp. 580-81.
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But classical utilitarianism, which we rejected, might be closer to average utilitarianism, which we would have chosen if we could have, than
are the two principles which we did choose. It might be closer, in the
sense described, because it would dictate more of the particular decisions that average utilitarianism would require, and thus be a better
description of ultimate moral reality, than would the two principles. Of
course, average utilitarianism might itself be rejected in a still larger
list, and the choice we should then make might indicate that another
member of the original list was better than either classical utilitarianism
or the two principles.
The second sort of relativism would be equally damaging on the
natural model, for reasons I have already explained. If the technique
of equilibrium is used by a single person, and the intuitions allowed to
count are just his and all of his, then the results may be authoritative
for him. Others, whose intuitions differ, will not be able to accept his
conclusions, at least in full, but he may do so himself. If, however, the
technique is used in a more public way, for example, by fixing on what
is common amongst the intuitions of a group, then the results will be
those that no one can accept as authoritative, just as no one could accept
as authoritative a scientific result reached by disregarding what he
believed to be evidence at least as pertinent as the evidence used.
So the natural model turns out to be poor support for the equilibrium
technique. None of the difficulties just mentioned count, however, if
we assume the technique to be in the service of the constructive model.
It is, within that model, a reason for rejecting even a powerful conviction that it cannot be reconciled with other convictions by a plausible
and coherent set of principles; the conviction is rejected not as a false
report, but simply as ineligible within a program that meets the demands of the model. Nor does either respect in which the technique is
relative embarrass the constructive model. It is not an embarrassment
that some theory not considered might have been deemed superior if it
had been considered. The model requires officials or citizens to proceed
on the best program they can now fashion, for reasons of consistency
that do not presuppose, as the natural model does, that the theory
chosen is in any final sense true. It does not undermine a particular
theory that a different group, or a different society, with different culture and experience, would produce a different one. It may call into
question whether any group is entitled to treat its moral intuitions as
in any sense objective or transcendental, but not that a particular society, which does treat particular convictions in that way, is therefore
required to follow them in a principled way.
I shall assume, therefore, at least tentatively, that Rawls's methodol-
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ogy presupposes the constructive model of reasoning from particular
convictions to general theories of justice, and I shall use that assumption in my attempt to show the further postulates of moral theory that
lie behind his theory of justice.
B.

The Contract

I come, then, to the second of the three features of Rawls's methodology that I want to discuss, which is the use he makes of the old idea of
a social contract. I distinguish, as does Rawls, the general idea that an
imaginary contract is an appropriate device for reasoning about justice,
from the more specific features of the original position, which count
as a particular application of that general idea. Rawls thinks that all
theories that can be seen to rest on a hypothetical social contract of some
sort are related and are distinguished as a class from theories that cannot; he supposes, for example, that average utilitarianism, which can
be seen as the product of a social contract on a particular interpretation,
is more closely related to his own theory than either is to classical utilitarianism, which cannot be seen as the product of a contract on any interpretation. 14 In the next section I shall consider the theoretical basis
of the original position. In this section I want to consider the basis of
the more general idea of the contract itself.
Rawls says that the contract is a powerful argument for his principles
because it embodies philosophical principles that we accept, or would
accept if we thought about them. We want to find out what these principles are, and we may put our problem this way. The two principles
comprise a theory of justice that is built up from the hypothesis of a
contract. But the contract cannot sensibly be taken as the fundamental
premise or postulate of that theory, for the reasons I described in the
first part of this article. It must be seen as a kind of halfway point in a
larger argument, as itself the product of a deeper political theory that
argues for the two principles through rather than from the contract. We
must therefore try to identify the features of a deeper theory that would
recommend the device of a contract as the engine for a theory of justice,
rather than the other theoretical devices Rawls mentions, like the device
of the impartial spectator. 15
We shall find the answer, I think, if we attend to and refine the
familiar distinction philosophers make between two types of moral
theories, which they call teleological theories and deontological theories.16 I shall argue that any deeper theory that would justify Rawls's
14 Chapter 30.
15 Pp. 144 ff.
18 Rawls defines these terms at pp. 24-25 and 30.
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use of the contract must be a particular form of deontological theory, a
theory that takes the idea of rights so seriously as to make them fundamental in political morality. I shall try to show how such a theory would
be distinguished, as a type, from other types of political theories, and
why only such a theory could give the contract the role and prominence
Rawls does.
I must begin, this argument, however, by explaining how I shall use
some familiar terms. (1) I shall say that some state of affairs is a goal
within a particular political theory if it counts in favor of a political
act, within that theory, that the act will advance or preserve that state
of affairs, and counts against an act that it will retard or threaten it.
Goals may be relatively specific, like full employment or respect for
authority, or relatively abstract, like improving the general welfare,
advancing the power of a particular nation, or creating a utopian society according to a particular concept of human goodness or of the
good life. (2) I shall say that an individual has a right to a particular
political act, within a political theory, if the failure to provide that act,
when he calls for it, would be unjustified within that theory even if the
goals of the theory would, on the balance, be disserviced by that act.
The strength of a particular right, within a particular theory, is a function of the degree of disservice to the goals of the theory, beyond a mere
disservice on the whole, that is necessary to justify refusing an act called
for under the right. In the popular political theory apparently prevailing in the United States, for example, individuals have rights to free
public speech on political matters and to a certain minimum standard
of living, but neither right is absolute and the former is much stronger
than the latter. (3) I shall say that an individual has a duty to act in a
particular way, within a political theory, if a political decision constraining such act is justified within that theory notwithstanding that no goal
of the system would be served by that decision. A theory may provide,
for example, that individuals have a duty to worship God, even though
17
it does not stipulate any goal served by requiring them to do so.

The three concepts I have described work in different ways, but they
all serve to justify or to condemn, at least pro tanto, particular political
decisions. In each case, the justification provided by citing a goal, a
right, or a duty is in principle complete, in the sense that nothing need
be added to make the justification effective, if it is not undermined by
some competing considerations. But, though such a justification is in
17 I do not count, as goals, the goal of respecting rights or enforcing duties. In this and
other apparent ways my use of the terms I define is narrower than ordinary language

permits.
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this sense complete, it need not, within the theory, be ultimate. It remains open to ask why the particular goal, right, or duty is itself justified, and the theory may provide an answer by deploying a more basic
goal, right, or duty that is served by accepting this less basic goal, right,
or duty as a complete justification in particular cases.
A particular goal, for example, might be justified as contributing to
a more basic goal; thus, full employment might be justified as contributing to greater average welfare. Or a goal might be justified as serving
a more basic right or duty; a theory might argue, for example, that improving the gross national product, which is a goal, is necessary to
enable the state to respect the rights of individuals to a decent minimum
standard of living, or that improving the efficiency of the police process
is necessary to enforce various individual duties not to sin. On the other
hand, rights and duties may be justified on the ground that, by acting
as a complete justification on particular occasions, they, in fact serve
more fundamental goals; the duty of individuals to drive carefully may
be justified, for example, as serving the more basic goal of improving
the general welfare. This form of justification does not, of course, suggest that the less basic right or duty itself justifies political decisions
only when these decisions, considered one by one, advance the more
basic goal. The point is rather the familiar one of rule utilitarianism,
that treating the right or duty as a complete justification in particular
cases, without reference to the more basic goal, will in fact advance the
goal in the long run.
So goals can be justified by other goals or by rights or duties, and
rights or duties can be justified by goals. Rights and duties can also be
justified, of course, by other, more fundamental duties or rights. Your
duty to respect my privacy, for example, may be justified by my right
to privacy. I do not mean merely that rights and duties may be correlated, as opposite sides of the same coin. That may be so when, for example, a right and the corresponding duty are justified as serving a
more fundamental goal, as when your right to property and my corresponding duty not to trespass are together justified by the more fundamental goal of socially efficient land use. In many cases, however, corresponding rights and duties are not correlative, but one is derivative
from the other, and it makes a difference which is derivative from which.
There is a difference between the idea that you have a duty not to lie to
me because I have a right not to be lied to, and the idea that I have a
right that you not lie to me because you have a duty not to tell lies. In
the first case I justify a duty by calling attention to a right; if I intend
any further justification it is the right that I must justify, and I cannot
do so by calling attention to the duty. In the second case it is the other
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way around. The difference is important because, as I shall shortly try
to show, a theory that takes rights as fundamental is a theory of a different character from one that takes duties as fundamental.
Political theories will differ from one another, therefore, not simply
in the particular goals, rights, and duties each sets out, but also in the
way each connects the goals, rights, and duties it employs. In a wellformed theory some consistent set of these, internally ranked or
weighted, will be taken as fundamental or ultimate within the theory.
It seems reasonable to suppose that any particular theory will give ultimate pride of place to just one of these concepts; it will take some overriding goal, or some set of fundamental rights, or some set of transcendent duties, as fundamental, and show other goals, rights, and duties as
18
subordinate and derivative.
We may therefore make a tentative initial classification of the political theories we might produce, on the constructive model, as deep theories that might contain a contract as an intermediate device. Such a
theory might be goal-based, in which case it would take some goal, like
improving the general welfare, as fundamental; it might be right-based,
taking some right, like the right of all men to the greatest possible overall liberty, as fundamental; or it might be duty-based, taking some duty,
like the duty to obey God's will as set forth in the Ten Commandments,
as fundamental. It is easy to find examples of pure, or nearly pure, cases
of each of these types of theory. Utilitarianism is, as my example suggested, a goal-based theory; Kant's categorical imperatives compose a
duty-based theory; and Tom Paine's theory of revolution is right-based.
Theories within each of these types are likely to share certain very
general characteristics. The types may be contrasted, for example, by
comparing the attitudes they display towards individual choice and
conduct. Goal-based theories are concerned with the welfare of any particular individual only in so far as this contributes to some state of
affairs stipulated as good quite apart from his choice of that state of
affairs. This is plainly true of totalitarian goal-based theories, like
fascism, that take the interest of a political organization as fundamental.
It is also true of the various forms of utilitarianism, because, though
they count up the impact of political decisions on distinct individuals,
and are in this way concerned with individual welfare, they merge
these impacts into overall totals or averages and take the improvement
of these totals or averages as desirable quite apart from the decision of
any individual that it is. It is also true of perfectionist theories, like
Aristotle's, that impose upon individuals an ideal of excellence and take
the goal of politics to be the culture of such excellence.
Is But an "intuitionist" theory, as Rawls uses that term, need not. See p. 34,
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Right-based and duty-based theories, on the other hand, place the individual at the center, and take his decision or conduct as of fundamental importance. But the two types put the individual in a different
light. Duty-based theories are concerned with the moral quality of his
acts, because they suppose that it is wrong, without more, for an individual to fail to meet certain standards of behavior. Kant thought that
it was wrong to tell a lie no matter how beneficial the consequences,
not because having this practice promoted some goal, but just because
it was wrong. Right-based theories are, in contrast, concerned with the
independence rather than the conformity of individual action. They
presuppose and protect the value of individual thought and choice.
Both types of theory make use of the idea of moral rules, codes of conduct to be followed, on individual occasions, without consulting selfinterest. Duty-based theories treat such codes of conduct as of the essence, whether set by society to the individual or by the individual to
himself. The man at their center is the man who must conform to such
a code, or be punished or corrupted if he does not. Right-based theories,
however, treat codes of conduct as instrumental, perhaps necessary to
protect the rights of others, but having no essential value in themselves.
The man at their center is the man who benefits from others' compliance, not the man who leads the life of virtue by complying himself.
We should, therefore, expect that the different types of theories would
be associated with different metaphysical or political temperaments,
and that one or another would be dominant in certain sorts of political
economy. Goal-based theories, for example, seem especially compatible
with homogeneous societies, or those at least temporarily united by an
urgent, overriding goal, like self-defense or economic expansion. We
should also expect that these differences between types of theory would
find echoes in the legal systems of the communities they dominate.
We should expect, for example, that a lawyer would approach the
question of punishing moral offenses through the criminal law in a
different way if his inchoate theory of justice were goal-, right- or
duty-based. If his theory were goal-based he would consider the full
effect of enforcing morality upon his overriding goal. If this goal were
utilitarian, for example, he would entertain, though he might, in the
end, reject, Lord Devlin's arguments that the secondary effects of punishing immorality may be beneficial.' 9 If his theory were duty-based,
on the other hand, he would see the point of the argument, commonly
called retributive, that since immorality is wrong the state must punish
it even if it harms no one. If his theory were right-based, however, he
19 See Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
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would reject the retributive argument, and judge the utilitarian argument against the background of his own assumption that individual
rights must be served even at some cost to the general welfare.
All this is, of course, superficial and trivial as ideological sociology.
My point is only to suggest that these differences in the character of a
political theory are important quite apart from the details of position
that might distinguish one theory from another of the same character.
It is for this reason that the social contract is so important a feature of
Rawls's methodology. It signals that his deep theory is a right-based
theory, rather than a theory of either of the other two types.
The social contract provides every potential party with a veto: unless
he agrees, no contract is formed. The importance, and even the existence, of this veto is obscured in the particular interpretation of the
contract that constitutes the original position. Since no one knows anything about himself that would distinguish him from anyone else, he
cannot rationally pursue any interest that is different. In these circumstances nothing turns on each man having a veto, or, indeed, on there
being more than one potential party to the contract in the first place.
But the original position is only one interpretation of the contract, and
in any other interpretation in which the parties do have some knowledge with which to distinguish their situation or ambitions from those
of others, the veto that the contract gives each party becomes crucial.
The force of the veto each individual has depends, of course, upon his
knowledge, that is to say, the particular interpretation of the contract
we in the end choose. But the fact that individuals should have any veto
at all is in itself remarkable.
It can have no place in a purely goal-based theory, for example. I do
not mean that the parties to a social contract could not settle on a
particular social goal and make that goal henceforth the test of the
justice of political decisions. I mean that no goal-based theory could
make a contract the proper device for deciding upon a principle of
justice in the first place; that is, the deep theory we are trying to find
could not itself be goal-based.
The reason is straightforward. Suppose some particular overriding
goal, like the goal of improving the average welfare in a community, or
increasing the power and authority of a state, or creating a utopia according to a particular conception of the good, is taken as fundamental
within a political theory. If any such goal is fundamental, then it authorizes such distribution of resources, rights, benefits, and burdens
within the community as will best advance that goal, and condemns any
other. The contract device, however, which supposes each individual
to pursue his own interest and gives each a veto on the collective de-
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cision, applies a very different test to determine the optimum distribution. It is designed to produce the distribution that each individual
deems in his own best interest, given his knowledge under whatever
interpretation of the contract is specified, or at least to come as close to
that distribution as he thinks he is likely to get. The contract, therefore,
offers a very different test of optimum distribution than a direct application of the fundamental goal would dictate. There is no reason to
suppose that a system of individual vetoes will produce a good solution
to a problem in which the fairness of a distribution, considered apart
from the contribution of the distribution to an overall goal, is meant
to count for nothing.
It might be, of course, that a contract would produce the result that
some fundamental goal dictates. Some critics, in fact, think that men in
the original position, Rawls's most favored interpretation of the contract, would choose a theory of justice based on principles of average
utility, that is, just the principles that a deep theory stipulating the
fundamental goal of average utility would produce.20 But if this is so, it
is either because of coincidence or because the interpretation of the
contract has been chosen to produce this result; in either case the contract is supererogatory, because the final result is determined by the
fundamental goal and the contract device adds nothing.
One counterargument is available. Suppose it appears that the fundamental goal will in fact be served only if the state is governed in
accordance with principles that all men will see to be, in some sense,
in their own interest. If the fundamental goal is the aggrandizement of
the state, for example, it may be that this goal can be reached only if
the population does not see that the government acts for this goal, but
instead supposes that it acts according to principles shown to be in their
individual interests through a contract device; only if they believe this
will they work in the state's interest at all. We cannot ignore this devious, if unlikely, argument, but it does not support the use that Rawls
makes of the contract. The argument depends upon a deception, like
Sidgewick's famous argument that utilitarianism can best be served by
keeping the public ignorant of that theory.21 A theory that includes such
a deception is ineligible on the constructivist model we are pursuing,
because our aim, on that model, is to develop a theory that unites our
convictions and can serve as a program for public action; publicity is
as much a requirement of our deep theory as of the conception of justice
that Rawls develops within it.
20 John Mackie presented a forceful form of this argument to an Oxford seminar in
the fall of 1972.

21 H. SmGEWiCK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 489 ff. (7th ed. 1907).
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So a goal-based deep theory cannot support the contract, except as a
useless and confusing appendage. Neither can a duty-based deep theory,
for much the same reasons. A theory that takes some duty or duties to
be fundamental offers no ground to suppose that just institutions are
those seen to be in everyone's self-interest under some description.
I do not deny, again, that the parties to the contract may decide to impose certain duties upon themselves and their successors, just as they
may decide to adopt certain goals, in the exercise of their judgment of
their own self-interest. Rawls describes the duties they would impose
upon themselves under his most favored interpretation, the original
position, and calls these natural duties. 22 But this is very different from
supposing that the deep theory, which makes this decision decisive of
what these duties are, can itself be duty-based.
It is possible to argue, of course, as many philosophers have, that a
man's self-interest lies in doing his duty under the moral law, either
because God will punish him otherwise, or because fulfilling his role
in the natural order is his most satisfying activity, or, as Kant thought,
because only in following rules he could consistently wish universal can
he be free. But that says a man's duties define his self-interest, and not
the other way round. It is an argument not for deciding upon a man's
particular duties by letting him consult his own interest, but rather for
his setting aside any calculations of self-interest except calculations of
duty. It could not, therefore, support the role of a Rawlsian contract in
a duty-based deep theory.
It is true that if a contract were a feature of a duty-based deep theory,
an interpretation of the contract could be chosen that would dissolve
the apparent conflict between self-interest and duty. It might be a
feature of the contract situation, for example, that all parties accepted
the idea just mentioned, that their self-interest lay in ascertaining and
doing their duty. This contract would produce principles that accurately described their duties, at least if we add the supposition that they
are proficient, for some reason, in discovering what their duties are. But
then, once again, we have made the contract supererogatory, a march
up the hill and then back down again. We would have done better simply to work out principles of justice from the duties the deep theory
takes as fundamental.
The contract does, however, make sense in a right-based deep theory.
Indeed, it seems a natural development of such a theory. The basic idea
of a right-based theory is that distinct individuals have interests that
they are entitled to protect if they so wish. It seems natural, in develop22 Chapter 19.
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ing such a theory, to try to identify the institutions an individual would
veto in the exercise of whatever rights are taken as fundamental. The
contract is an excellent device for this purpose, for at least two reasons.
First, it allows us to distinguish between a veto in the exercise of these
rights and a veto for the sake of some interest that is not so protected,
a distinction we can make by adopting an interpretation of the contract
that reflects our sense of what these rights are. Second, it enforces the
requirements of the constructive model of argument. The parties to the
contract face a practical problem; they must devise a constitution from
the options available to them, rather than postponing their decision to
a day of later moral insight, and they must devise a program that is both
practical and public in the sense I have described.
It seems fair to assume, then, that the deep theory behind the original
position must be a right-based theory of some sort. There is another
way to put the point, which I have avoided until now. It must be a
theory that is based on the concept of rights that are natural, in the
sense that they are not the product of any legislation, or convention, or
hypothetical contract. I have avoided that phrase because it has, for
many people, disqualifying metaphysical associations. They think that
natural rights are supposed to be spectral attributes worn by primitive
men like amulets, which they carry into civilization to ward off tyranny.
Mr. Justice Black, for example, thought it was a sufficient refutation
of a judicial philosophy he disliked simply to point out that it seemed
23
to rely on this preposterous notion.
But on the constructive model, at least, the assumption of natural
rights is not a metaphysically ambitious one. It requires no more than
the hypothesis that the best political program, within the sense of that
model, is one that takes the protection of certain individual choices as
fundamental, and not properly subordinated to any goal or duty or
combination of these. This requires no ontology more dubious or controversial than any contrary choice of fundamental concepts would be
and, in particular, no more than the hypothesis of a fundamental goal
that underlies the various popular utilitarian theories would require.
Nor is it disturbing that a Rawlsian deep theory makes these rights
natural rather than legal or conventional. Plainly, any right-based
theory must presume rights that are not simply the product of deliberate
legislation or explicit social custom, but are independent grounds for
judging legislation and custom. On the constructive model, the assumption that rights are in this sense natural is simply one assumption to be
made and examined for its power to unite and explain our political
23 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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convictions, one basic programatic decision to submit to this test of
coherence and experience.
C.

The Original Position

I said that the use of a social contract, in the way that Rawls uses it,
presupposes a deep theory that assumes natural rights. I want now to
describe, in somewhat more detail, how the device of a contract applies
that assumption. It capitalizes on the idea, mentioned earlier, that some
political arrangements might be said to be in the antecedent interest
of every individual even though they are not, in the event, in his actual
interest.
Everyone whose consent is necessary to a contract has a veto over the
terms of that contract, but the worth of that veto, to him, is limited by
the fact that his judgment must be one of antecedent rather than actual
self-interest. He must commit himself, and so abandon his veto, at a
time when his knowledge is sufficient only to allow him to estimate the
best odds, not to be certain of his bet. So the contract situation is in one
way structurally like the situation in which an individual with specific
political rights confronts political decisions that may disadvantage him.
He has a limited, political right to veto these, a veto limited by the
scope of the rights he has. The contract can be used as a model for the
political situation by shaping the degree or character of a party's ignorance in the contractual situation so that this ignorance has the same
force on his decision as the limited nature of his rights would have in
the political situation.
This shaping of ignorance to suit the limited character of political
rights is most efficiently done simply by narrowing the individual goals
that the parties to the contract know they wish to pursue. If we take
Hobbes's deep theory, for example, to propose that men have a fundamental natural right to life, so that it is wrong to take their lives, even
for social goals otherwise proper, we should expect a contract situation
of the sort he describes. Hobbes's men and women, in Rawls's phrase,
have lexically ordered security of life over all other individual goals;
the same situation would result if they were simply ignorant of any
other goals they might have and unable to speculate about the chances
that they have any particular one or set of these.
The ignorance of the parties in the original position might thus be
seen as a kind of limiting case of the ignorance that can be found, in the
form of a distorted or eccentric ranking of interests, in classical contract
theories and that is natural to the contract device. The original position
is a limiting case because Rawls's men are not simply ignorant of interests beyond a chosen few; they are ignorant of all the interests they
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have. It would be wrong to suppose that this makes them incapable of
any judgments of self-interest. But the judgments they make must
nevertheless be very abstract; they must allow for any combination of
interests, without the benefit of any supposition that some of these are
more likely than others.
The basic right of Rawls's deep theory, therefore, cannot be a right
to any particular individual goal, like a right to security of life, or a
right to lead a life according to a particular conception of the good.
Such rights to individual goals may be produced by the deep theory,
as rights that men in the original position would stipulate as being in
their best interest. But the original position cannot itself be justified
on the assumption of such a right, because the parties to the contract
do not know that they have any such interest or rank it lexically ahead
of others.
So the basic right of Rawls's deep theory must be an abstract right,
that is, not a right to any particular individual goal. There are two candidates, within the familiar concepts of political theory, for this role.
The first is the right to liberty, and it may strike many readers as both
plausible and comforting to assume that Rawls's entire structure is
based on the assumption of a fundamental natural right to libertyplausible because the two principles that compose his theory of justice
give liberty an important and dominant place, and comforting because
the argument attempting to justify that place seems uncharacteristically
24
incomplete.
Nevertheless, the right to liberty cannot be taken as the fundamental
right in Rawls's deep theory. Suppose we define general liberty as the
overall minimum possible constraints, imposed by government or by
other men, on what a man might want to do.25 We must then distinguish this general liberty from particular liberties, that is, freedom from
such constraints on particular acts thought specially important, like
participation in politics. The parties to the original position certainly
have, and know that they have, an interest in general liberty, because
general liberty will, pro tanto, improve their power to achieve any
particular goals they later discover themselves to have. But the qualification is important, because they have no way of knowing that general
liberty will in fact improve this power overall, and every reason to suspect that it will not. They know that they might have other interests,
beyond general liberty, that can be protected only by political constraints on acts of others.
24 See Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 534 (1973).
25 Cf. Rawls's definition of liberty at p. 202.
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So if Rawlsian men must be supposed to have a right to liberty of
some sort, which the contract situation is shaped to embody, it must be
a right to particular liberties. Rawls does name a list of basic liberties,
and it is these that his men do choose to protect through their lexically
ordered first principle of justice.26 But Rawls plainly casts this principle
as the product of the contract rather than as a condition of it. He argues
that the parties to the original position would select these basic liberties
to protect the basic goods they decide to value, like self-respect, rather
than taking these liberties as goals in themselves. Of course they might,
in fact, value the activities protected as basic liberties for their own
sake, rather than as means to some other goal or interest. But they certainly do not know that they do.
The second familiar concept of political theory is even more abstract
than liberty. This is equality, and in one way Rawlsian men and women
cannot choose other than to protect it. The state of ignorance in the
original position is so shaped that the antecedent interest of everyone
must lie, as I said, in the same solution. The right of each man to be
treated equally without regard to his person or character or tastes is
enforced by the fact that no one else can secure a better position by
virtue of being different in any such respect. In other contract situations, when ignorance is less complete, individuals who share the same
goal may nevertheless have different antecedent interests. Even if two
men value life above everything else, for example, the antecedent interest of the weaker might call for a state monopoly of force rather than
some provision for private vengeance, but the antecedent interest of the
stronger might not. Even if two men value political participation above
all else, the knowledge that one's views are likely to be more unorthodox
or unpopular than those of the other will suggest that his antecedent
interest calls .for different arrangements. In the original position no such
discrimination of antecedent interests can be made.
It is true that, in two respects, the principles of justice that Rawls
thinks men and women would choose in the original position may be
said to fall short of an egalitarian ideal. First, they subordinate equality
in material resources, when this is necessary, to liberty of political
activity, by making the demands of the first principle prior to those of
the second. Second, they do not take account of relative deprivation,
because they justify any inequality when those worse off are better off
than they would be, in absolute terms, without that inequality.
Rawls makes plain that these inequalities are required, not by some
competing notion of liberty or some overriding goal, but by a more
26 P. 61.
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basic sense of equality itself. He accepts a distinction between what he
calls two conceptions of equality:
Some writers have distinguished between equality as it is invoked
in connection with the distribution of certain goods, some of which
will almost certainly give higher status or prestige to those who are
more favored, and equality as it applies to the respect which is
owed to persons irrespective of their social position. Equality of
the first kind is defined by the second principle of justice ....
But equality of the second kind is fundamental. 27
We may describe a right to equality of the second kind, which Rawls
says is fundamental, in this way. We might say that individuals have a
right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of
the political institutions that govern them. This is a highly abstract
right. Someone might argue, for example, that it is satisfied by political
arrangements that provide equal opportunity for office and position on
the basis of merit. Someone else might argue, to the contrary, that it is
satisfied only by a system that guarantees absolute equality of income
and status, without regard to merit. A third man might argue that equal
concern and respect is provided by that system, whatever it is, that improves the average welfare of all citizens counting the welfare of each
on the same scale. A fourth might argue, in the name of this fundamental equality, for the priority of liberty, and for the other apparent
inequalities of Rawls's two principles.
The right to equal concern and respect, then, is more abstract than
the standard conceptions of equality that distinguish different political
theories. It permits arguments that this more basic right requires one
or another of these conceptions as a derivative right or goal.
The original portion may now be seen as a device for testing these
competing arguments. It supposes, reasonably, that political arrangements that do not display equal concern and respect are those that are
established and administered by powerful men and women who,
whether they recognize it or not, have more concern and respect for
members of a particular class, or people with particular talents or ideals,
than they have for others. It relies on this supposition in shaping the
ignorance of the parties to the contract. Men who do not know to which
class they belong cannot design institutions, consciously or unconsciously, to favor their own class. Men who have no idea of their own
conception of the good cannot act to favor those who hold one ideal over
those who hold another. The original position is well designed to en27 P. 511.
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force the abstract right to equal concern and respect, which must be
understood to be the fundamental concept of Rawls's deep theory.
If this is right, then Rawls must not use the original position to argue
for this right in the same way that he uses it, for example, to argue for
the rights to basic liberties embodied in the first principle. The text
confirms that he does not. It is true that he once says that equality of
respect is "defined" by the first principle of justice.28 But he does not
mean, and in any case he does not argue, that the parties choose to be
respected equally in order to advance some more basic right or goal.
On the contrary, the right to equal respect is not, on his account, a
product of the contract, but a condition of admission to the original
position. This right, he says, is "owed to human beings as moral persons," and follows from the moral personality that distinguishes humans
from animals. It is possessed by all men who can give justice, and only
such men can contract. 29 This is one right, therefore, that does not
emerge from the contract, but is assumed, as the fundamental right
must be, in its design.
Rawls is well aware that his argument for equality stands on a different footing from his argument for the other rights within his theory:
Now of course none of this is literally argument. I have not set
out the premises from which this conclusion follows, as I have tried
to do, albeit not very rigorously, with the choice of conceptions
of justice in the original position. Nor have I tried to prove that
the characterization of the parties must be used as the basis of
equality. Rather this interpretation seems to be the natural completion of justice as fairness.30
It is the "natural completion," that is to say, of the theory as a whole.
It completes the theory by providing the fundamental assumption that
charges the original position, and makes it an "intuitive notion" for
developing and testing theories of justice.
We may therefore say that justice as fairness rests on the assumption
of a natural right of all men and women to equality of concern and
respect, a right they possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or
merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to
make plans and give justice. Many readers will not be surprised by this
conclusion, and it is, as I have said, reasonably clear from the text. It is
an important conclusion, nevertheless, because some forms of criticism
of the theory, already standard, ignore it. I shall close this long essay
with one example.
28 Id.

29 Chapter 77.
80 P. 509.
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One form of criticism has been expressed to me by many colleagues
and students, particularly lawyers. They point out that the particular
political institutions and arrangements that Rawls says men in the
original position would choose are merely idealized forms of those now
in force in the United States. They are the institutions, that is, of liberal
constitutional democracy. The critics conclude that the fundamental
assumptions of Rawls's theory must, therefore, be the assumptions of
classical liberalism, however they define these, and that the original
position, which appears to animate the theory, must somehow be an
embodiment of these assumptions. Justice as fairness therefore seems
to them, in its entirety, a particularly subtle rationalization of the
political status quo, which may safely be disregarded by those who
want to offer a more radical critique of the liberal tradition.
If I am right, this point of view is foolish, and those who take it lose
an opportunity, rare for them, to submit their own political views to
some form of philosophical examination. Rawls's most basic assumption is not that men have a right to certain liberties that Locke or Mill
thought important, but that they have a right to equal respect and concern in the design of political institutions. This assumption may be
contested in many ways. It will be denied by those who believe that
some goal, like utility or the triumph of a class or the flowering of some
conception of how men should live, is more fundamental than any individual right, including the right to equality. But it cannot be denied
in the name of any more radical concept of equality, because none
exists.
Rawls does argue that this fundamental right to equality requires
a liberal constitution, and supports an idealized form of present economic and social structures. He argues, for example, that men in the
original position would protect the basic liberties in the interest of their
right to equality, once a certain level of material comfort has been
reached, because they would understand that a threat to self-respect,
which the basic liberties protect, is then the most serious threat to equal
respect. He also argues that these men would accept the second principle in preference to material equality because they would understand
that sacrifice out of envy for another is a form of subordination to him.
These arguments may, of course, be wrong. I have certainly said nothing
in their defense here. But the critics of liberalism now have the responsibility to show that they are wrong. They cannot say that Rawls's basic
assumptions and attitudes are too far from their own to allow a confrontation.

